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ABSTRACT
The “manufacture” of factual indeterminacy in furtherance of tax
avoidance activity constitutes potentially unethical attorney conduct.
The structuring of facts toward tax avoidance is not merely the ren-
dering of legal advice as contemplated by the Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct, and instead may assist the Holmesian “bad man”
client toward conduct that is normatively prohibited under the tax
laws.  As such, only tax planning via factual structuring, which results
in determinative tax avoidance, is ethical attorney conduct.  Since a
purely formalistic method of legal interpretation is not applied in the
United States, the circumstance of determinative tax avoidance is ex-
traordinarily rare in the modern era.  The moral aspects of legal repre-
sentation in furtherance of tax evasion are also re-evaluated from both
the parochial and postmodern perspectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the tax attorney acting in the role of the tax “planner,”1 the
ethical and moral considerations for the practice of tax law are gener-
ally not given as a matter of legal ethics in the Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct (the “Model Code”).2  The “Model Code gives scant
attention to resolving the [tax] adviser’s peculiar ethical dilemmas”3
and is by no means an exhaustive statement of the law governing pro-
fessional conduct in the field of taxation.4  Indeed, “[m]any tax law-
1. See Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 185, 188-89 (2010) [hereinafter “R. Holmes I”] (“Yet, under the current tax regime,
it is not unusual for the tax lawyer to play the roles of advisor, advocate, endorser,
insurer, engineer, and even adversary.  It can be a tricky business wearing all of these
hats, particularly when tax lawyers are facing mounting pressures from powerful cli-
ents aggressively pushing to minimize their tax liabilities.”).
2. See Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1987) (“[I]t is likely that disciplinary constraints on tax practition-
ers will remain, to a surprising extent, within the unregulated discretion of the practi-
tioner.”); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to Clients and Duties to Others – the
Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the Acceptance of a Duty to the System,
63 TAX L. 169, 169 (2009) (“While all lawyers are subject to ethical constraints promul-
gated by the profession tax lawyers are additionally confronted with regulation by lay-
men through standards of practice promulgated by nonlawyers.”).
3. See Ann Southworth, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37
STAN. L. REV. 889, 911 (1985) (“Differences between lawyers’ roles as advocates and
advisers have only recently received formal recognition from the ABA, and the Model
Code gives scant attention to resolving the adviser’s peculiar ethical dilemmas.”).
4. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in
Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 676 (1981) (“Although it may seem
obvious that interpretation of a lawyer’s legal duty frequently requires reference to gen-
eral law as distinct from the rules of legal ethics, many lawyers seem to assume that the
text of the Model Code is an exhaustive statement of the law governing their profes-
sional conduct.  The Code is not exhaustive, however, for it does not purport to be pre-
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yers suggest that the idea of ethical or moral considerations impinging
on the tax-planning domain is simply absurd.”5  The current phenom-
enon of Holmesian “bad man”6 tax lawyering is thus not a question of
“zealous advocacy”7 by the tax attorney on behalf of a corporate cli-
ent.8  Rather, the pertinent question is whether the tax lawyer en-
gaged in the structuring of facts actually assists a multinational firm
toward conduct that the lawyer knows is “criminal” or “fraudulent.”9
emptive.  On the contrary, the rules of professional ethics presuppose and supplement
the law at large . . . . ”); Anthony C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the
Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX REV. 589, 605 (2003) (“The Model Rules do
not, however, purport to be an exhaustive compendium of the ethical norms that law-
yers must consider when deciding upon an appropriate course of professional conduct.
It is expected that lawyers will also be guided by their own moral compass and by the
norms imposed on them by their peers.  For tax lawyers, the uncodified norms that
guide professional conduct have generally been acknowledged to include a duty to the
revenue system.”).
5. Zoe¨ Prebble & John Prebble, The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 693, 715 (2010).
6. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460-61
(1897) (“[I]f we take the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not
care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the
Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact.  I am much of his mind.  The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law.”); see also Bret N. Bogenschneider, Manufactured Factual Indetermi-
nacy and the Globalization of Tax Jurisprudence, 4 U. C. LONDON J.L. & JURIS. 250, 251
(2015) (“Such manufactured factual indeterminacy represents an aspect of Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes’ ‘bad man’ problem where multinational firms are able to engage in tax
planning to intentionally create factual indeterminacy and thereby benefit from formal-
istic interpretation of tax laws.  This subset of legal indeterminacy is often observed in
the context of tax treaty interpretation and related tax planning by multinational
firms.”).
7. See generally Richard Lavoie, Am I My Brother’s Keeper? A Tax Law Perspec-
tive on the Challenge of Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations and Zealous Advocacy in the
Legal Profession, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 813 (2013) [hereinafter “Lavoie I”].
8. See Simone de Colle & Ann Marie Bennett, State-induced, Strategic, or Toxic?
An Ethical Analysis of Tax Avoidance Practices, BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 33:1 (2014);
Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX NOTES
201, 202 (2004) (“[W]e could not have been more wrong in placing our trust in corporate
counsel and their tax advisors.”); but see James P. Holden, Practitioners’ Standard of
Practice and the Taxpayer’s Reporting Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 327 (1991) (“The
tax law defines the taxpayer’s rights and duties; the practitioner’s role is to advise the
taxpayer with respect to those rights and duties.  Accordingly, the taxpayer is the pri-
mary actor, and the practitioner only advisor.  Recognizing this, we first address the
taxpayer standard of conduct and then the practitioner standard.”).
9. See Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the
System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 852 (1999) (“[A] client can put a lawyer at risk if the
client has committed tax fraud and the tax lawyer’s advice might assist in furthering
the fraud.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope § 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(“For example, a lawyer who commits fraud in the conduct of a business is subject to
discipline for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresenta-
tion.”); Durst, supra note 2, at 1054 (“The prohibition of lawyer assistance in “criminal
or fraudulent” behavior has considerable appeal in identifying conduct in which the cli-
ent has no proper claim to legal assistance.  While different criminal acts may involve
varying degrees of culpability, by designating conduct as “criminal” the legislative au-
thority clearly signifies that the conduct is normatively wrong.”).
778 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
Notably, in the context of professional conduct, the word “fraudulent”
does not refer to “criminal tax fraud,” with its specific connotations
and rare applicability in the Internal Revenue Code,10 but refers in-
stead to conduct to which is substantively or “normatively” prohibited
under applicable law.11  Geoffrey Hazard referred to this as conduct to
which is in some degree illegal by reference to proscriptions of the gen-
eral tax law.12  The tax lawyer when acting as factual tax “planner”
must also comply with the substantive aspects of tax law.13  The word
“normative” means in this context, at minimum, that a purely formal-
istic14 understanding of given tax laws (i.e., the Internal Revenue
Code and Treasury Regulations) will not suffice to determine the ethi-
cal standard of behavior for a tax lawyer.15  It is, therefore, not
enough from an ethical perspective for the tax lawyer to merely struc-
ture facts that appear to meet the literal language of the tax code.16
10. Watson, supra note 9, at 882 (“This presents the first hurdle for the attorney:
determining whether the noncompliance, error, or omission amounts to fraud.  Tax
fraud is not specifically defined under the Internal Revenue Code, (“the Code”), and may
include a variety of offenses.”); Durst, supra note 2, at 1055 (“Nevertheless, this behav-
ior does not necessarily constitute ‘fraud,’ which has a special meaning under the Code
and is addressed by severe criminal and civil penalties . . . . [a]n attempt to measure the
standards under sections 6653(a) and 6661 against the ‘crime or fraud’ prohibition of
Model Rule 1.2(d) requires a somewhat closer review of the hierarchy of penalties in the
Code, as well as consideration of the social goals the Congress has addressed . . . .”).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble & scope § 16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(“The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal
rules.  The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.”); Durst,
supra note 2, at 1053 n. 92 (“[Hazard] would seek to identify, and prohibit lawyer assis-
tance in, conduct in which the client is normatively prohibited (by reference to proscrip-
tions in the “general” law) from engaging.  Professor Hazard recognized that this would
entail distinguishing among legal provisions that do, and do not, establish normative
prescriptions.”).
12. Hazard, supra note 4, at 672 (“[T]he question concerns action by the client that
is in some degree illegal.  ‘Illegality’ is itself a matter of degree.”).
13. R. Holmes I, supra note 1, at 201 (“It should be noted, however, that tax law-
yers primarily act as transaction engineers and rarely appear in court or have direct
contact with litigation.  Rather, the bulk of their work involves planning, structuring,
and compliance work.”).
14. See William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Re-
sponsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457 (2006) (“Some
lawyers, however, are formalists all the time, or at least, they are always ready to be
formalists when doing so would serve client interests.  They will invoke the public inter-
est when that helps the client, but they do not feel constrained by any public interest
that is not fully articulated in positive rules.  They thus stand ready to exploit ‘loop-
holes’ and ‘technicalities’—formal interpretations of rules that thwart their underlying
purposes.”).
15. See HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (Knight, tr., 2d ed., 2005); Hans
Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 52-
3 (1941).
16. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 713 (“There is a strong tradition of constru-
ing tax statutes literally . . . .  This strict interpretation approach is important for the
success of tax avoidance schemes . . . .  A tax avoidance scheme can succeed then if the
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Of course, from such a “normative” perspective of the tax laws, tax
avoidance planning is usually by some degree illegal.  For example, tax
planning performed on behalf of the “bad man” typically involves the
“manufacture” of a factually indeterminate transaction.17  That is, the
corporate tax “planner” takes one set of given facts, where the applica-
tion of tax law appears to determinatively result in the payment of tax
under the law, and prospectively changes these facts to a second set of
facts, where the application of the tax law is indeterminate.18  The
“manufactured” facts are thus presumably not within the boundaries
of settled law, and are by some degree potentially illegal because the
application of law to the new set of facts is unknown.  In these circum-
stances, the tax attorney thus acts to transition the situation toward
indeterminacy.  This push toward indeterminacy is unusual in the
practice of law since most of the time lawyers act to enhance or foster
determinative legal outcomes, and not vice versa.  In the case where
the manufactured facts are wholly artificial, the United States De-
partment of Treasury has already acted to limit the scope of tax law-
yer assistance.19
Under the classical interpretation of the rules for professional
conduct, the tax attorney, engaged in such manufacture of factual in-
determinacy, relies on the idea that this second set of manufactured
facts constitutes a novel and “good faith” effort to test the bounds of
applicable tax law.20  A highly profitable side-effect of this arrange-
ment is what is referred to as the “audit lottery” where such a “good
faith” challenge to existing law is often never tested in an adversarial
proceeding with the taxing authority.21  However, this reliance on ac-
court confines itself to the literal interpretation of the formal dimension of the tax law; a
scheme is likely to fail if the court looks beyond the form of the transactions to whether
their underlying substance is within the law’s spirit, not just its letter.”).
17. Bogenschneider, supra note 6 (“Legal indeterminacy arises in the situation
where formalistic legal analysis cannot provide a determinate result on the application
of a known set of facts.  Factual indeterminacy pertains in situations where the facts
themselves are disputed and cannot clearly be settled and comprise the actual subject of
the dispute.  In tax law practice, indeterminacy is typically of the factual kind.”).
18. See Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681,
692 (1997) (“[T]he lawyer’s personal integrity is particularly significant in tax planning,
where the lawyer assists her client in making or creating facts, rather than in charac-
terizing events that have already occurred.”).
19. 31 U.S.C.A. § 330, Circular 230 (West 2014).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble & scope § 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(“While it is a lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action,
it is also a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.”).
21. Loren Prescott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Repre-
sentation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 713 (1997) (“By playing the ‘audit lottery’—taking a
favorable return position that the IRS would likely challenge, knowing that the risk of
detection is minimal if the position appears on the return without disclosure—taxpay-
ers enjoy the benefits associated with questionable return positions while prevailing
over the IRS on those positions by default.”).
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tively testing the boundaries of applicable tax law as the sole basis for
the ethical standard of the tax lawyer is flawed irrespective of
whether the tax lawyer acts with the primary goal of participating in
the audit lottery.22  Rather, the manufacture of factual indeterminacy
typically does not render a determinative legal result, and simply cre-
ates an unknown (i.e., indeterminate) application of tax law.  This con-
duct is separately prohibited since an attorney may not affirmatively
act to undermine the application of laws.  Furthermore, as a matter of
legal methodology, the tax attorney in this context often fails to act
within the substantive requirements of the tax law, where reliance is
placed on a formalistic interpretive method, which has been expressly
rejected in the tax context.23
The moral considerations as to tax avoidance activity are often
given as determinable by literal compliance with the applicable tax
law.  Such view relates in part to Judeo-Christian moral values in the
historical payment of tax under Roman law in the first century.  How-
ever, tax avoidance behavior is generally not rendered moral merely
because it may be lawful.  Rather, the New Testament passage deal-
ing with taxation, Romans 13:6-7, is re-translated (from Greek) indi-
cating that Paul called for “deference” to interpretation of tax law by
the Roman taxing authorities.  Postmodern considerations of morality
given as an existential view of the effect to the human subject, such as
that of So¨ren Kierkegaard, are also applied here in the tax context in
lieu of libertarian or utilitarian moral theory.
This Article is structured as follows: first, formalistic legal inter-
pretation and its predominant role in the context of tax ethics is dis-
cussed in detail.24  Second, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) initiative with large corporate
taxpayers toward “cooperative compliance” is discussed from the per-
spective of professional ethics, suggesting that if the taxing authority
is cooperative with large corporate taxpayers then the relationship is
22. Watson, supra note 9, at 886-87 (“[T]he attorney also must be careful not to use
the audit lottery to justify the client’s illegal position.”); see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. &
Bradley T. Borden, Probability, Professionalism, and Protecting Taxpayers, 68 TAX LAW
83, 107 (2014) (“In addition, the practitioner must ascertain and consider all relevant
facts, relate the applicable law—including potentially applicable judicial doctrines—to
the relevant facts, and never, in evaluating the merits of a tax position or transaction,
‘take into account the possibility that a tax return will not be audited or that a matter
will not be raised on audit.’ ”).
23. See R. Holmes I, supra note 1, at 196 (“[C]lients want to push the limits of
textualist interpretations in order to capitalize on loopholes that are created.”); see also
Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Indus-
try, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 88 (2006) (“Consistent with an emphasis on return prepara-
tion, the dominant interpretive approach of tax accountancy has historically been
textualist.”).
24. See infra notes 28-53 and accompanying text.
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not adversarial and may fall outside ABA Opinion 85-352.25  Third,
several ethical dilemmas of tax lawyering are explored reflecting the
inherent indeterminacy in the tax law.26  Finally, the underlying
moral considerations of legal representation of the Holmesian “bad
man” are discussed.27
II. FORMALISM & TAX ETHICS
The ethics of tax lawyering are historically predicated on a for-
malistic (i.e., determinative) view of tax law.  A determinative view of
the law means that by reading the text of the tax provision one should
be able to determine a conclusive result based on the law itself.28  The
Model Code, for the most part, contemplates the ethical requirements
of tax lawyers in these determinative terms.29  However, this determi-
native approach does not sync particularly well with tax law in the
United States.  That is, a realist view of the law is commonly referred
to as “legal realism.”30  Under this understanding of the law, tax laws
are not taken as logically determinative.  Rather, legal outcomes may
depend on what the judge in a particular case is likely to decide.31
Furthermore, in the context of taxation, laws are often inconsistently
enforced against large corporations (but are strictly enforced against
small businesses), thus rendering the law indeterminate as a matter
of enforcement practice.32
A formalistic method of legal interpretation is in fact applied in
Continental Europe and Latin America.33  This is particularly true in
the context of tax treaty interpretation.  As such, the approach of legal
“formalism” gives rise to a major inconsistency in international taxa-
25. See infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 74-91 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 92-123 and accompanying text.
28. For a detailed discussion of the determinacy of tax law in the context of taxa-
tion see Bogenschneider, supra note 6 (“As such, Dworkin shares with the formalists a
belief that the law is determinate but he differs as to why.  For him, determinate an-
swers are possible through the application of moral principles because political morality
holds determinate truths.”).
29. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“A
lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional
service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs.”).
30. See generally Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749
(2013); Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as a Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1915 (2005).
31. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurispru-
dence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 277-78 (1997) (“ ‘Formalism’—is committed to the descriptive
claim that judges respond primarily—indeed, perhaps exclusively—to the rational de-
mands of the applicable rules of law and modes of legal reasoning.”).
32. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, A Proposal for Equal Enforcement of the AET, 147
TAX NOTES 931 (2015).
33. See John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 50, 77-79 (1996).
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tion depending on the jurisdiction at issue.  For example, under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, if the form of the tax treaty
does not render a determinative result, then the result may be consid-
ered effectively a “null” (i.e., yielding double non-taxation).34  On the
other side of the spectrum, in the United States a “null” result in the
tax context is rare.  The codified economic substance doctrine (along
with various judicial anti-abuse principles) does cause tax decisions to
be affirmatively decided.  However, a mere observation of legal inde-
terminacy does not reach the full substance of what tax lawyers and
accountants actually do in the role of tax planners – and that is to
manipulate facts and not merely to “interpret” laws.  As such, when
the lawyer advises as a matter of fact in the role of tax planner such is
not a question of rendering legal advice, but is a question of fact.35
Indeed, the determination of whether a specific tax arrangement is
designed to undermine the law is generally determined by tax lawyers
as a matter of application of law-to-fact and not solely as a matter of
legal interpretation.36  The bottom line is that the ethical require-
ments of tax lawyers in the United States must take into account the
possibility of non-formalistic indeterminacy in the context of tax law.
The potential for indeterminacy in the tax law is generally not
taken into account as a matter of professional ethics.37  For example,
any reference to “criminal” tax evasion presumes that the tax lawyer
34. Judith Herdin & Michael Schilcher, Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in Aus-
tria, at 15-16, in AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE NON-TAXATION (Michael Lang ed., 2003) (“As
mentioned above the tax authorities believe the object and purpose of tax treaties is to
avoid double taxation and double non-taxation in general.  This is in accordance with
the Commentaries on Art. 23 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (“OECD”) Model Convention which states that the basic function of Art. 23
would be to eliminate double taxation.  This view cannot be shared fully.  The tax trea-
ties restrict the taxing rights of the contracting states in the areas they are regulating.
A further purpose cannot be deduced . . . .  If the contracting states want to exclude non-
taxation, they have to insert subject-to-tax clauses.  If they do not stipulate this clause,
there is no legal basis to assume that the states wanted to prevent double non-
taxation.”).
35. For the alternative view, see Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 727 (“[T]he
difference between evasion and avoidance is essentially a matter of law, not of relevant
fact.”).
36. Richard Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance
in Enforcing the Internal Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 5 (2008) [hereinafter “Lav-
oie II”] (“Preparing tax returns requires taxpayers to understand the relevant provi-
sions of the Code and apply them to their particular factual circumstances.  Every tax
return thus requires legal judgments regarding both the meaning of the Code and its
application to specific situations.”).
37. See generally Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s Role
in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115 (2004) [hereinafter “Lavoie
III”].
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is able to determine what constitutes criminal conduct.  This is not a
matter of degree.38
A reference to the Gregory v. Helvering39 decision40 is customarily
given for the assertion that the taxpayer may structure his affairs to
avoid the payment of tax.41  The reference is as follows: “Any one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury;
there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”42  Learned
Hand dissented along similar lines in a subsequent case, Commis-
sioner v. Newman, as follows:
Over and over again the Courts have said that there is noth-
ing sinister in so arranging affairs as to keep taxes as low as
possible . . . .  Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right,
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands.43
Yet, the formalistic tax planning at issue in Gregory, or similar
seminal tax avoidance cases, would not fly today.44  The Gregory deci-
sion was made under a formalistic legal methodology to reach a deter-
minative result of tax avoidance under the terms of the statute.  In the
modern era, this would not be the legal methodology generally applied
in the United States, nor would it yield a determinative result under
the applicable statute.  Tax law does not strictly involve a formal
method of legal interpretation.  The case would probably not now be
decided in favor of the taxpayer at all.  Accordingly, it may be unethi-
cal for a tax lawyer to engineer a transaction under Gregory, not be-
cause the audit lottery might fail, but because the transaction does not
38. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 702 (“Tax evasion is illegal.  It consists of
the willful violation or circumvention of applicable tax laws in order to minimize tax
liability.  Tax evasion generally involves either deliberate under-reporting or non-re-
porting of receipts, or false claims to deductions.  This conduct is legally straightforward
to identify; a taxpayer has committed tax evasion only if he or she has breached a rele-
vant law.  Indeed, evasion ordinarily involves criminal fraud.”).
39. 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
40. Rick Taylor, Rusty Pipes is Simply Rusty, Says Tax Practitioner, TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 11, 1994, LEXIS 94 TNT 135-46 (“I will do everything that I can to be
absolutely certain that my clients do not pay one dime more tax than is absolutely re-
quired!  That is what I was trained to do and that is what my clients pay me to do.  To
accuse me or anyone else in the tax community of not ‘playing fair’ and to demand that I
somehow overlook planning ideas in the name of morals is, in the words of Judge
Learned Hand, ‘mere cant.’”).
41. Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); see, e.g., Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 702.
42. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810.
43. Commissioner v. Newman, 150 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.,
dissenting).
44. See Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 712 (“But if a taxpayer were to repeat
the Mangin scheme today and were challenged by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue,
the courts would certainly hold the scheme to be void for tax purposes[.]”).
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yield a formal determinative result of lawful tax avoidance.45  In the
best case, the likely result is indeterminacy (i.e., to some degree ille-
gal), and for an attorney to structure this is not ethical conduct.  How-
ever, it would of course be ethical for an attorney to issue a legal
opinion on the likely merits of exactly the same transaction (consis-
tent with Circular 230) for the purpose of penalty avoidance.  This sce-
nario of whether and how to issue a legal opinion – where the tax
lawyer wears solely a lawyer’s hat – does not address the ethical “di-
lemmas” faced by most tax lawyers engaged in actual tax planning
practice.46
In jurisprudential terms, subsequent to the decision in Gregory,
the United States codified an “economic substance” doctrine, and
other nations codified a comparable General Anti-Avoidance Rule
(“GAAR”).47  The statutory framework of the United States thus ex-
pressly states that a purely formalistic approach may not be applied
as a method of tax analysis in some cases.  The tax lawyer cannot rely
solely on the formalism of the statute to determine her ethical respon-
sibility.  Notably, the addition of the “economic substance” doctrine ef-
fectively mandates this “normative” assessment process as an ethical
requirement of the tax lawyer in the United States.  As such, the ethi-
cal responsibility of the tax lawyer in a non-formalist tax jurisdiction
generally depends on her assessment of the law as applied to a partic-
ular factual situation.
However, with the oft-given citation to Learned Hand or Lord
Tomlin,48 the idea is that professional ethics can be discerned simply
45. See id. (“If an avoidance scheme cannot achieve a reduction in tax liability
without secrecy, it is hard to see it as legal in any robust sense.  A scheme that will
clearly be struck down if it should ever be challenged seems to be only weakly or contin-
gently within the law.”).
46. See Lavoie I, supra note 7, at 823 (“The questions become harder when a tax
lawyer is consulted in the planning stages of a transaction, where the legal questions
presented rarely have clear-cut answers.  The role of the tax lawyer is to sort through
the extant authorities and utilize her experience and judgment in determining the legal
strength of a given tax position.”).
47. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2015) (“In the case of any transaction to which the economic
substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic
substance only if: (A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal
income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a sub-
stantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transac-
tion.”); see also Finance Act 2013, c. 29, § 5, sch. 43 (UK); Council Directive 16435/14
amending Council Directive 2011/96/EU of November 30, 2011 on the Common System
of Taxation Applicable in Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Mem-
ber States, annex I, 2011 O.J. (L345) 8; Romero J.S. Tavares & Bret N. Bogenschneider,
The New De Minimis Anti-abuse Rule in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive: Validating EU
Tax Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance?, 43 INTERTAX 495 (2015).
48. Duke of Westminster v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1936] AC 1 at 19-21
(Eng.) (“Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching
under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be.  If he succeeds in ordering
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by reading the law itself.  Tax lawyers are thus presumed to always
act in a formalized manner where the application of tax law always
yields a determinative result.  In the actual practice of tax law, how-
ever, tax lawyers often manufacture factual indeterminacy on behalf
of the client.49  The “legal realist” nature of tax practice is reflected in
the various thresholds for the issuance of tax opinions mandated by
the Treasury Department for penalty avoidance (i.e., “more likely than
not,” “substantial authority” and so forth).50  Nonetheless, a formalist
approach to tax ethics may indeed be possible, as evidenced in Latin
America or Continental Europe, which actually apply a formalistic
method of legal interpretation in the tax context.51  That is, if the tax
statutes are internally complete then the tax lawyer need not look to
the substance of the transaction to determine her ethical require-
ments, since the outcome is always determinate by operation of law.
The question of whether determinacy by law is even possible is an
ongoing matter of debate in legal circles, but certainly after the imple-
mentation of the economic substance doctrine that debate is ongoing
only outside the taxing jurisdiction of the United States.52  Thus,
within the United States, the ethical requirements of lawyers are rela-
tive based on the particular facts at issue.  The tax attorney must ap-
ply judgment relative to each individual tax situation.53
Under this view, the decision in Gregory is limited to tax planning
which yields a determinative legal result by operation of law.  The is-
sue in that case determinatively resulted in the non-payment of tax by
them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of
Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled
to pay an increased tax.”).
49. See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING AP-
PEALS (1960); Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76
VA. L. REV. 937 (1990); Brian H. Bix, Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the
Problem of Legal Determinacy?, RATIO JURIS 16:3 (2003).
50. See Ventry & Borden, supra note 22, at 172 (“New 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 prohibited
practitioners from advising a taxpayer-client to take an undisclosed position without a
‘realistic possibility of the position being sustained on its merits.’  A position met the
‘realistic possibility’ standard, moreover, if ‘a reasonable and well-informed analysis by
a person knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a person to conclude that the
position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on
its merits.’”).
51. See generally Robert W. McGee & Wendy Gelman, Opinions on the Ethics of
Tax Evasion: A Comparative Study of the USA and Six Latin American Countries, 24
AKRON TAX J. 69 (2009).
52. I.R.C. § 7701.  Clarification of Economic Substance Doctrine. (1) Application of
the doctrine in the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is
relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance only if: (A) the
transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the
taxpayer’s economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart
from Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.
53. Lavoie II, supra note 36, at 5.
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operation of the statute.  Accordingly, to say that Gregory would prob-
ably not fly today implies that the tax result under the modern statute
and method of legal interpretation is indeterminate.  Moreover, al-
though it is certainly possible that a taxpayer might re-structure his
affairs so as to obtain a determinative legal outcome, in the modern
era, this outcome is a rare bird.  In the more prototypical situation, the
tax lawyer intentionally manufactures a second set of facts to cause an
indeterminate application of the tax laws, and, conveniently, the po-
tential for non-detection via the “audit lottery.”  The re-structuring
thus yields indeterminacy, not determinative tax avoidance.  Accord-
ingly, the creation of factual indeterminacy toward tax avoidance is
always by some degree illegal exactly because the “scheme” is indeter-
minate as to the outcome.
III. IS CORPORATE TAX PLANNING “ADVERSARIAL” IN THE
MODERN ERA OF “COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE?”
Professional tax ethics is premised on the idea of tax compliance
and, by extension tax planning, as an adversarial proceeding similar
to civil litigation.  As explained by Prescott: “the tax compliance pro-
cess involves a dispute between two adversaries – the taxpayer and
the IRS – and should be treated as an adversarial proceeding warrant-
ing partisan advocacy on the part of the taxpayer’s lawyer.”54  Accord-
ingly, in the context of such an adversarial proceeding “a lawyer owes
to his client a complete loyalty that precludes any duty to the govern-
ment or the tax system.”55  The duty of the lawyer is often referred to
as “zealous” advocacy.56  From this perspective, the manufacture of
factual indeterminacy by the tax lawyer seems less objectionable be-
cause it is the responsibility of the opposing party in the adversarial
proceeding to uncover and challenge the indeterminacy within the tax
planning.  Notably, the manufacturing of a second set of facts by the
tax attorney and presenting these revised facts to the taxing authority
seems akin to misrepresentation, at least if the first set of facts is
given as also true.  In that case, the tax lawyer would seem to have a
duty not to remain silent and at least to disclose the first version of
truth to the taxing authority.  Indeed, apart from the context of actual
litigation, the idea of multiple factual truths is, at minimum, problem-
atic.57  Yet, this is a moral problem in the tax context, and not techni-
cally an issue of professional ethics, but only so as long as tax
54. Prescott, supra note 21, at 693-94.
55. Deborah H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2005 (1982).
56. Prescott, supra note 21, at 701 (“The lawyer’s ethical duty of loyalty to the cli-
ent creates an obligation to represent the client’s interests ‘zealously within the bounds
of the law.’”).
57. See generally DENNIS M. PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1999).
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compliance and planning is taken as akin to an “adversarial”
proceeding.
The issue of whether the context of tax planning constitutes an
“adversarial” proceeding was openly questioned58 during an “unsuc-
cessful effort during the 1980s to characterize the return preparation
process as nonadversarial.”59  The adversarial approach to profes-
sional ethics was endorsed by the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
Ethics Committee in the Formal Opinion 85-352.
The Committee began its reconsideration of the lawyer’s duties as
tax return advisor by implicitly endorsing the conclusion of Formal
Opinion 314 that the return preparation process should be treated as
an adversarial proceeding and that the tax lawyer’s duties are those of
an advocate.  The Committee concluded that a lawyer can have a good
faith belief in the validity of a position only if there is “some realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated,” but acknowledged that
“[a] lawyer can have a good faith belief in this context even if the law-
yer believes the client’s position probably will not prevail.”60
Yet, following the ABA’s approach, once one accepts the nature of
tax practice as generally adversarial, then the “duty” of loyalty (or
“zealous” representation) to the client is of paramount importance, but
still potentially limited because of the nature of tax practice.  As ex-
plained by Galler:
Tax practice differs from other areas because the client’s adver-
sary is always the government.  The question has long been debated
whether this distinction implies that attorneys engaging in the tax
practice are subject to different standards than attorneys who practice
in other areas of the law.61
In classical terminology, to challenge that “duty” to the client may
require the positing of a competing set of duties.62  These competing
sets of duties of the tax attorney have been characterized as a duty to
58. See Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW 643 (1986).
59. See Prescott, supra note 21, at 721 n. 124 (“Following the release of Formal
Opinion 85-352 in 1985, the Treasury Department issued a proposal to amend its Rules
of Practice that included an endorsement of a nonadversarial approach to the prepara-
tion of tax returns . . . .  The proposal met with considerable resistance from professional
groups and eventually was withdrawn in favor of the litigation-based standard en-
dorsed by the legal profession.”).
60. Prescott, supra note 21, at 719-21.
61. Galler, supra note 18, at 694.
62. See Watson, supra note 9, at 884 (“The problem is that the attorney owes a
legal duty to the client to represent the client in the manner in which the attorney
accepted employment.  Thus, first and foremost, the attorney must consider the inter-
ests of the client.  But the attorney also has distinct duties that may conflict with the
client’s interests.  For example, according to the ABA, an attorney has a duty to avoid
deliberately misleading the IRS and to prevent the client from doing so.”).
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the revenue system, a duty to act honestly and ethically, and a duty to
the government.63  However, the interaction of these duties is signifi-
cantly different in the context of a “cooperative,” or non-adversarial,
tax compliance process upon which the ABA Formal Opinion 85-532
was premised.64
A. THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AND ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE
ON “CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE”
In the period after the American Bar Association (“ABA”) ruled
that the tax preparation process should be treated as an adversarial
proceeding, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) changed its tax en-
forcement process vis-a`-vis large corporate taxpayers.  The IRS gener-
ally does not apply an adversarial audit strategy with large
corporations.65  The non-adversarial enforcement program was piloted
in a program referred to by the acronym “CAP.”66  As summarized by
Leviner: “The IRS has engaged in a revolutionary renovation of large
business tax administration in a manner that, in many ways, is con-
sistent with responsive tax administration theory.  Fundamentally,
the IRS has shifted toward cooperative tax regulation with large busi-
ness taxpayers.”67  As these cooperative programs were implemented,
the audit rate for large corporations also dropped dramatically.68
Similarly, outside the United States, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) has developed a
model of “co-operative compliance” which is currently implemented in
63. Galler, supra note 18, at 693-97; see generally BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES
HOLDEN & DEBORAH SCHENK, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (3d ed.
1995).
64. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
65. Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From “Big Stick” to Responsive
Regulation, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 381, 411-12 (2011) (“Five key motivational pos-
tures have been identified as relevant to the realm of tax compliance. These are: (1)
commitment, (2) capitulation, (3) resistance, (4) disengagement, and (5) game playing.
The first two postures, commitment and capitulation, are compliant in nature, the for-
mer more than the latter.”).
66. Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism about Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L.
REV. 121, 123 (2012) (“The most significant and transformative is the Compliance As-
surance Process (“CAP”), which began as a pilot program for large business taxpayers in
2005.  CAP is a real-time compliance review process, whereby large business taxpayers
work with the IRS to resolve all tax positions prior to tax return filing.”).
67. Id. at 122.
68. Rachelle Y. Holmes, Forcing Cooperation: A Strategy for Improving Tax Com-
pliance, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1423 [hereinafter “R. Holmes II”] (“[T]he audit rate for
corporate LBEs has been dropping dramatically over the past five years and is signifi-
cantly down from the 44% rate in the 2005 fiscal year.  Even among the largest of these
corporations—those with assets of $5 billion or more—the audit rate has declined 17%
over the last two years, from 78% in 2007 to 64% in 2009.”).
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some taxing jurisdictions of the European Union and Australia.69  The
OECD model is closely related to what is commonly referred to as “re-
sponsive regulation.”70  The non-adversarial strategy of responsive
regulation was described as follows:
For taxpayers demonstrating good faith, the carrot of a less
heavy-handed enforcement approach would generate goodwill and en-
courage their inclination toward public-regarding behavior.  For unco-
operative taxpayers, deploying the stick of aggressive enforcement
would overcome their reluctance to adhere to the arm’s-length stan-
dard.  In effect, taxpayers are forced to identify themselves as what
Raskolnikov labels gamers and non-gamers.71
In light of these developments, a pertinent question is whether
the ABA Formal Opinion 85-532 remains relevant to tax planning
practice of corporate tax lawyers subject to merely Internal Revenue
Service co-operative compliance enforcement, as opposed to adver-
sarial-style tax enforcement.
B. CORPORATE TAX LAWYER ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH
“COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE”
Prior to implementation of the aforementioned co-operative com-
pliance initiatives, the idea of general cooperation between the tax-
payer and the taxing authority was discussed in the tax literature
only as a hypothetical.  Notably, the “co-operative compliance” model
is typically presented under a formalistic and determinative view of
the tax law, where the goal of tax enforcement is given as ensuring
that large corporations “pay the right amount of tax, in the right juris-
diction and at the right time.”72  Accordingly, Prescott described tax-
payer cooperation with the taxing authority in the compliance process
with the following:
If taxpayers cooperate by sharing relevant information with
the IRS, the agency can better select for examination those
returns most in need of review.  Conversely, if taxpayers re-
fuse to cooperate with the IRS by minimizing disclosure of the
information needed by the government to assess the need for
69. OECD, CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE: A FRAMEWORK: FROM ENHANCED RELATION-
SHIP TO CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE (2013).
70. Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 L.
& POL’Y 3 (2007).
71. Steven A. Dean, Tax Deregulation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 428 (2011).
72. Jeffrey Owens, The Role of Tax Administrations in the Current Political Cli-
mate, BULLETIN FOR INT’L TAX’N 67:3, 6 (2014) (“Finally, for tax administration to effec-
tively implement the tax laws and to ensure that MNEs and other taxpayers pay the
right amount of tax, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time requires the govern-
ments to provide a clear legal framework and the resources that they need to achieve
this.”).
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review of returns, tax compliance suffers . . . .  These taxpay-
ers limit disclosure of information relating to aggressive re-
turn positions in an effort to handicap IRS efforts to identify
and debate the issues raised by these return positions during
examination of the return.73
In such cases, where the taxpayer and the taxing authority agree
that the tax assessment can be identified as part of a formalized, de-
terminative process, then it follows that the role of the tax lawyer,
under those circumstances, is presumptively not to manufacture fac-
tual indeterminacy without full disclosure to the taxing authority.  To
create indeterminacy when the client has agreed to a deterministic as-
sessment of tax (e.g., under a co-operative compliance program) would
violate the duty of the taxpayer to the taxing authority in entering
into the cooperative compliance program in the first place.  That is,
under these circumstances, the word “cooperation” in tax assessment
conclusively requires that the tax lawyer may only engage in tax plan-
ning which is determinate as a matter of law, as opposed to intention-
ally indeterminate.  As such, where the large corporate taxpayer
enters into a cooperative compliance program (or where cooperative
compliance is the general standard of compliance in a particular tax-
ing jurisdiction), then the tax lawyer is ethically required not to manu-
facture factual patterns with merely “some realistic possibility of
success” without full disclosure to the taxing authority.  In other
words, the IRS and OECD “co-operative compliance” initiatives effec-
tively void the result in ABA Formal Opinion 85-532.  Accordingly,
under these circumstances, the tax lawyer engaged in structuring in-
determinate fact patterns would potentially violate both the objective
requirements of the Model Code as well as the substantive require-
ments under the general tax laws.
IV. VARIOUS ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN TAX LAWYERING
The manufacturing of factual indeterminacy by a tax lawyer
amounts to unethical attorney conduct in most circumstances.  How-
ever, various practical dilemmas can be posited that seemingly justify
indeterminate applications of fact to tax law as ethical attorney con-
duct.  A few of these practical dilemmas are the following: (i) tax
avoidance via indeterminacy may only be civil tax avoidance and not
criminal fraud; (ii) the manufacture of indeterminate factual transac-
tions on behalf of a client can be done in “good faith” as a challenge to
tax laws; and (iii) the Holmesian “bad man” is entitled to “zealous”
representation, and as such, the tax lawyer operates for the better-
73. Prescott, supra note 21, at 712-13.
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ment of society in the representation of the Holmesian “bad man.”  Ac-
cordingly, each of these practical dilemmas are discussed in detail.
A. THE VIEW OF TAX PLANNING AS CIVIL TAX AVOIDANCE NOT
CRIMINAL FRAUD
The traditional approach in professional ethics in tax lawyering is
to posit a “crisp” line as between tax avoidance of the “civil” variety
and “criminal” tax fraud.74  The distinction is given as if tax lawyers
will always know the difference.75  Perhaps this distinction is helpful
in “easy” cases, or under a formalistic method of legal interpretation.76
For example, intentional violation of the advance transfer pricing
rules under Internal Revenue Code section 482 in some cases might
constitute tax fraud under egregious circumstances, not just civil tax
avoidance.77  Everyone agrees a tax lawyer cannot assist in this sort of
criminal corporate tax planning.  But, such brazen determinate tax
fraud is relatively rare.  The difference between civil tax avoidance
and criminal tax fraud is generally unknown.78  At least in the tax
context, the distinction between civil tax avoidance and criminal fraud
is a matter of degree just as described by Hazard.79
Notwithstanding such practical difficulties in the identification of
criminal tax fraud, the tax lawyer counseling toward “civil” tax avoid-
ance may believe that the attorney is allowed to engage in
nondeceitful conduct in which the client openly breaches a contractual
obligation.80  As explained by Durst:
74. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 711-12 (“ ‘The law draws a line’ between tax
avoidance and tax evasion.  This line may be fine, but it is supposed to be crisp, such
that any set of facts will fall ‘on one side of it or the other.’  By definition, tax avoidance
falls on the ‘safe side,’ whereas tax evasion is on the ‘wrong side’ of the line.  In practice,
however, the line can become blurred in a way that definition alone does not suggest.”).
75. Prescott, supra note 21, at 754-55 (“Taxpayers are entitled to seek any lawful
objective defined by the internal revenue laws.  The lawyer serving as taxpayer advisor
and representative is ethically obligated to advise and assist clients in seeking those
lawful objectives.  When the law is unclear, the tax lawyer may resolve doubt in favor of
the taxpayer.  But unlike lawyers engaged in other areas of practice, tax lawyers may
not take client loyalty to its logical extreme by recommending any nonfrivolous position.
Rather, lawyers representing taxpayers may recommend only those positions satisfying
the higher ‘realistic possibility of success’ standard adopted by the ABA Ethics Commit-
tee in Formal Opinion 85-352.”).
76. Galler, supra note 18, at 692 (“Some cases are easy.”).
77. Section 482 refers to the transfer pricing rules for intercompany related party
transactions for corporations.  For further detail see I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3) (2015); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-6 (2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (2016).
78. Hazard, supra note 4, at 672.
79. Id.
80. See Watson, supra note 9, at 890 (“The attorney’s primary consideration is to
avoid being a party to the fraud . . . .  There are two general ways in which an attorney
may be considered a party to the fraud.  First, when she is perceived to be counseling
the client to commit tax fraud, or to conceal the fact of the fraud.  Second, when the
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In most instances, the modern contract simply represents an
undertaking by the parties that if they do not perform, they
will pay appropriate damages.  The party who decides to
breach, and thereby incur liability for damages, may act
within the realm of normal commercial expectation and does
not necessarily breach a normative obligation.81
However, compliance with the tax laws is not exclusively a “civil”
matter.  The payment of taxes is not just a contractual requirement.
Furthermore, simply because “damages” upon noncompliance with a
tax law might be paid as a dollar judgment to the taxing authority (as
opposed to imprisonment) does not bear on the question of noncompli-
ance as a “civil” versus “criminal” (i.e., tax “evasion”) matter.  The as-
sertion that the tax lawyer may counsel tax avoidance of the “civil”
variety simply because any deficiency may be recovered as a matter of
quasi-contractual rights may raise a host of other potential issues, and
at the very least, does not resolve the issue.
B. MANUFACTURED FACTUAL INDETERMINACY AS “GOOD FAITH”
CHALLENGE TO TAX LAWS
A “good faith challenge” to the tax law means that the position
must be disclosed by the taxpayer presumably on the face of the tax
return.  American Bar Association (“ABA”) Formal Opinion 85-532
contemplates a non-frivolous argument by the tax lawyer as part of an
adversarial proceeding.82  The rule is as follows:
[The lawyer’s] conduct is within the bounds of the law, and
therefore permissible, if the position taken is supported by
the law or is supportable by a good faith argument for an ex-
tension, modification, or reversal of the law.  However, a law-
yer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is
frivolous.83
A secretive tax position is, by definition, not a good faith challenge
to the law.  Indeed, a secretive tax position is not even a “bad faith”
challenge to existing law since such does not constitute a challenge to
the law at all.  The idea of such secretive indeterminacy tax planning
attorney has knowledge of the fraud, continues to represent the client, and subse-
quently gives false or fraudulent information to a third party.”).
81. Durst, supra note 2, at 1054.
82. See Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with this Picture?: The Tension Between
Analytical Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L.
REV. 353, 360 (1991) (“First, the italicized language indicates that the definition of ‘not
frivolous’ in the litigation context, as including ‘a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law,’ does not include a requirement that there be a
realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated.  Thus, the realistic possibility of
success standard found in Opinion 85-352 appears to be higher than a non-frivolous
standard.”).
83. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
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was previously identified by the Prebbles as “hard” to justify.84  But,
this view contemplates only “bad faith” positions not disclosed on the
tax return.  To the contrary, a determinate tax position may ethically
not be disclosed on the tax return in “good faith” because the law is
presumptively settled,85 but an indeterminate tax position intended
as a “challenge” to existing law must be disclosed on the tax return (or
in an appropriate factual disclosure) in order for it to have any poten-
tial to benefit the tax system.  This interpretation is consistent with
the role of a tax attorney in an adversarial proceeding where legal
arguments would be at least presented to the court (or, here the IRS)
for review.86  Furthermore, for the reasons set forth above, in the con-
text of co-operative compliance regimes, then both determinate and
indeterminate tax structuring transactions should be disclosed to the
taxing authority.
C. EVEN A HOLMESIAN “BAD MAN” IS ENTITLED TO ENGAGE IN TAX
PLANNING
The definition of a Holmesian “bad man” is a taxpayer with no
regard for the law and simply wants to determine what he can get
away with.  In the tax context, the “bad man” is often referred to as a
“gamer.”87  With co-operative compliance, the goal of tax administra-
tion is to efficiently distinguish the “bad man” from other taxpayers,
and devote more substantial enforcement resources to these taxpay-
ers.  Notably, a Holmesian “bad man” would actually thus be pre-
cluded from raising a “good faith” challenge to existing law because he
does not act with “good faith” by definition.  A problem for professional
ethics, not yet acknowledged by the American Bar Association
(“ABA”), is whether a tax lawyer acts in “good faith” to raise such a
challenge where the client would be prohibited from doing so directly,
and where the lawyer knows the client would be prohibited from doing
so.  The issue was further explained by Watson:
84. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 712.
85. Galler, supra note 18, at 697 (“She may advise the statement of positions most
favorable to the client, even if she believes that the positions probably will not prevail,
so long as she has a good faith belief that those positions are warranted in existing law
or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.”).
86. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, What Are Penalties For?, 85 TAX NOTES 709
(1999).
87. Valerie Braithwaite & John Braithwaite, An Evolving Compliance Model for
Tax Enforcement, in CRIMES OF PRIVILEGE: READINGS IN WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, 405
(Neal Shover & John Paul Wright, eds., 2000); see Dean, supra note 71, at 428 (citing
Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforce-
ment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 704 (2009)).
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Another troublesome issue for the attorney is whether the cli-
ent can be trusted.  If the client is unwilling to file an
amended return, by definition that client has demonstrated a
willingness to commit a federal crime.  In tax practice, an at-
torney is entitled to rely on information furnished by a client
without having to verify the accuracy of every piece of infor-
mation the client furnishes, unless the attorney has reason to
question that information.88
Nonetheless, tax avoidance planning by a tax attorney designed
to assist the Holmesian “bad man” to avoid the tax laws, may be seen
as different only as a matter of degree from planning by an attorney
relating to the avoidance of any other law.  That is, any lawyer is cer-
tainly able to advise the client that one fact pattern results in tax and
another not, just as any lawyer is able to advise a client that one
course of action is lawful and another not.  And, this reflects the prior
scholarly literature on the ethical requirements for tax planning,
which hinges on the idea that tax planning is a determinative
process.89
For example, in the easy case, the lawyer (as tax planner) simply
presents various lawful courses of action to the “bad man” client to
choose from (i.e., the “bad man” client wants to know how much he can
get away with and not break the law).  However, in tax law, the “bad
man” wants the tax lawyer to present potentially unlawful courses of
action to choose from instead of lawful options.  And, everyone agrees
the tax lawyer cannot affirmatively create unlawful options for the
client.  So, the ethics of tax law hinges entirely on the significance of
“potentially” unlawful (i.e., indeterminate) as opposed to determina-
tively lawful if the attorney is to assist at all.90
A further situation arises where the “bad man” has already been
informed of a determinative legal option, then asks the tax lawyer
whether there is any other scenario where the law might not apply
determinatively but which could result in less taxation.  The “bad
man” client now seeks out factual indeterminacy.  Any lawyer may
play this game only so long as the client does not appear to be in-
tending to circumvent the application of law, i.e., if the purpose of the
planning is not to benefit from the indeterminacy of the law itself.
From a less cynical perspective, perhaps the lawyer ought to never
88. Watson, supra note 9, at 891.
89. Lavoie I, supra note 7, at 827 (“Note that the taxpayer has the legal duty to
report her correct tax based on the facts and the relevant law.”); Owens, supra note 72.
90. See Watson, supra note 9, at 882 (“When the attorney discovers in advance that
her client intends to mislead or defraud the government or any other third party, under
the Model Rules the attorney may inform the client of the consequences and must ad-
vise the client not to undertake the action.  If the client persists, the attorney must
withdraw from representing the client in order to avoid being a party to the fraud.”).
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presume such an intention on the part of the client.  But, in the situa-
tion where the lawyer then offers to develop the indeterminate factual
scenario independently, (i.e., to engage in indeterminacy planning)
that is a new issue entirely.  In that case, the lawyer has taken on
himself the intentional seeking out of factual indeterminacy, which is
the prohibited element.  The tax lawyer cannot take on the role of the
Holmesian “bad man” and advise potentially unlawful activity simply
because the tax lawyer knows that the “bad man” wants to determine
just what he can get away with under the tax laws.  Much of the prior
scholarly literature refers to the role of the attorney in this context as
tax “adviser,” as opposed to tax “planner,” to avoid discussion of this
very problem, since the traditional approach presumes the tax lawyer
merely renders legal advice and is not engaged in the creation of facts.
The question then arises as to why any tax lawyer would think
they might be able to counsel toward potentially unlawful tax avoid-
ance.  The justification has previously been given under the idea that
manufactured indeterminacy can be categorized as lawful or unlawful
by specifically analyzing discreet fact patterns and never looking to
the larger picture.91  But, the Model Code says this is not the case in
the context of professional ethics.  The lawyer must conduct a reasona-
ble investigation into the applicable facts and circumstances at issue.
If the law is determinate, then presumably tax advice given by the
lawyer could be given on a “yes or no” basis.92  Accordingly, where the
client asks about various potentially unlawful scenarios, when already
aware of the lawful scenario, then presumably the lawyer can con-
tinue to answer such questions, but only to a degree.  Separately, in
the situation where the tax lawyer is charged with creating a poten-
tially unlawful structure, then she must decline.
V. PREMODERN AND POSTMODERN MORAL
CONSIDERATION FOR THE TAX LAWYER
The existing literature on the morality of tax avoidance is rela-
tively scant.  In the seminal article, The Morality of Tax Avoidance,
Zoe and John Prebble argued that tax avoidance behavior may be im-
moral irrespective of whether it is legal.93  This is a surprising claim
in the tax context, since the moral question prior to the Prebbles’ arti-
cle was if criminal tax evasion was de facto immoral on the basis of
whether it should be considered malum in se versus malum prohib-
91. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (noting that
lawyers should not violate the law, and they have an ethical duty to not “shut their eyes
to what was plainly to be seen.”).
92. See generally STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW &
ETHICS (9th ed. 2013).
93. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 732.
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itum.  For example, Robert McGee concluded along these lines that
even criminal tax evasion was neither malum in se nor immoral.  Mc-
Gee wrote:
If there is nothing ethically wrong with tax evasion, it seems
to follow that attorneys, accountants and financial planners
should not be penalized for advising their clients to evade
taxes or even for helping them to evade taxes . . . .  If the
advocacy of tax evasion is not unethical, and it appears that it
is not, then a code of ethics that punishes individuals for ad-
vising their clients to evade taxes may itself be perpetrating
an injustice because it is punishing someone for advocating
something that is not unethical.94
The Prebbles’ focus on the view of formal compliance with the tax
law as consistent with morality itself is a major development in the
field of tax jurisprudence.95  Yet, conspicuously absent from the philo-
sophical analysis is any reference to postmodern accounts of morality
or ethics in the tax context.96  As an example, it is well-known that the
working poor tend to make charitable contributions at a rate far
higher relative to income than the wealthy, irrespective of whether
the contributions are tax deductible.97  From a postmodern perspec-
tive, this propensity of the poor to help others indicates a healthier
mental outlook vis-a`-vis the wealthy, because humans are social
beings.
In any case, prior analyses of the morality of tax avoidance activ-
ity were explicitly hedged based on an applicable philosophical stan-
dard.98  For example, the Prebbles applied the well-known Kantian
“categorical imperative” in the tax context,99 and referred to the fur-
therance of the “welfare state” via tax collections as the primary moral
94. Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 411, 434-35
(1994).
95. See Moraine, supra note 2, at 169 (“Whether because of popular myth, history,
or misconception, the public expects attorneys to act as unfettered advocates on behalf
of their clients.  Indeed, many attorneys believe that so long as they avoid basic wrongs
such as conflicts, lying, cheating, or stealing, they are serving as proper advocates.”).
96. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, Foucault and Tax Jurisprudence: On the Creation
of a “Delinquent” Class of Taxpayer, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 59 (2015).
97. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, Tax Jurisprudence with Benevolence & Love, 25
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 82 (2015) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., Options for Changing
the Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving (2011), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publi-
cation/42730); see also Hsin-Yi Lin & Kuang-Ta Lo, Tax Incentives and Charitable Con-
tributions: The Evidence from Censored Quantile Regression, 17 PAC. ECON. REV. 535
(2012).
98. Notably, the Prebbles also made a reference to “deontological” philosophy as
related to the applicable moral standard.  For a detailed discussion of this topic in the
context of taxation, see Richard Baron, The Ethics of Taxation, PHILOSOPHY NOW, May/
June 2012.
99. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 726.
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considerations.100  However, this in fact does premise the morality of
tax avoidance (either entirely or in part) on its presumptive fiscal ef-
fects on society.  McGee then gave a plausible response to the Prebbles
regarding application of the Kantian “categorical imperative” in the
tax context as follows:
Kant’s categorical imperative asks the question, “What would
happen if everyone did it?”  Kant would conclude that if the
universal practice of some act results in something bad, then
the act is unethical.  If nothing bad results from the universal
practice of the act, then it is not unethical.  The weakness of
this line of reasoning is highlighted when it is applied to the
question of tax evasion.  If taxation is theft—the taking of
property without the owner’s consent—one might ask, “What
would happen if everyone refused to allow their property to
be taken without their consent?”  One result would be a
marked decline in the amount of theft (taxation) and an in-
crease in the amount of justice.101
This approach is incomplete.  Tax avoidance should not be viewed
as immoral merely because of a weak ontological philosophical argu-
ment regarding its potential indirect effects on others through the re-
distributive transfer from rich to poor (i.e., based on loose “welfare
state” claims arising in the tax literature).102  In the United States the
overall tax system is regressive, thus rendering the modernist analy-
sis of the “welfare state” factually inapplicable.103  To the extent the
Enlightenment era ethical theory applies strictly individualistic moral
claims (or property rights) to justify tax avoidance in such libertarian
terms, that view is inapplicable based on the facts of modern society.
Rather, the secular morality of tax avoidance may depend on applica-
tion of moral theory developed after the Enlightenment era (i.e.,
postmodern moral theory).  In philosophical terms, the Enlightenment
era was not the end-stage in the development of ideas about moral
behavior, even though it is often separately taken as the end-stage in
the jurisprudence of taxation.104
100. Id. at 735-36.
101. McGee, supra note 94, at 425.
102. See Christopher Todd Meredith, The Ethical Basis for Taxation in the Thought
of Thomas Aquinas, 11 J. MKTS. & MORALITY 41, 53 (2008) (“This view of the taxing
power of the civil authority is quite narrowly circumscribed when compared with the
understanding of taxation that underlies the modern welfare state, but it stands in a
venerable tradition of Christian moral and political thought represented by such other
luminaries as Martin Luther and John Calvin.”).
103. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, Income Inequality & Regressive Taxation in the
United States, 4 INTERDISCIPLINARY J. ECON. & BUS. L. 8, 9-11 (2015), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract_id=2619151; Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S.
Persons by Income Level, 145 TAX NOTES 117 (2014).
104. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 SOC. PHIL. &
POL. 49 (1986).
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A. THE PAROCHIAL (PRE-MODERN) INTERPRETATION OF TAX
MORALITY AS LAWFULNESS
Judeo-Christian scholarship is also concerned with the morality
of taxation, and particularly the Roman tax practices in occupied Ju-
dea.105  Perhaps not surprisingly then the seminal statement of mo-
rality and taxes from the Christian perspective is often taken from the
writings of Paul in the New Testament, Romans 13:6-7, which pro-
vides as follows: This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are
God’s servants, who give their full time to governing.  Give to everyone
what you owe them: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then reve-
nue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor.106  From this pas-
sage, along with the oft-quoted: “Then give back to Caesar what is
Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s,”107 is derived an oft-stated view of
Christian scholars that taxes are owed only to the extent of the tax
law.108  Similarly, the Judeo view toward tax avoidance was generally
given along the lines of malum in se jurisprudence, or ontological ar-
guments related to the consequences of violating the law to the wider
religious community.109  Another noted Christian scholar goes so far
as to say that, in the passage of Romans 13:7, Paul may have used
“irony” (i.e., sarcasm) as a rhetorical technique in suggesting that
Christians should pay the Roman taxes.110  In either case, this leaves
open the door to lawful tax avoidance planning as moral behavior
from the parochial perspective.  However, in a highly-regarded series
of articles, Susan Pace Hamill gave a Christian response to regressive
tax policies in the United States.111  As I have also written separately,
105. See Robert W. McGee, Christian Views on the Ethics of Tax Evasion, 1 J. ACCT.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 210 (1998); Michael A. Livingston, The Preferential Option, Soli-
darity, and the Virtue of Paying Taxes: Reflections on the Catholic Vision of a Just Tax
System (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=958806; Paul Feinberg, The
Christian and Civil Authorities, 10 MASTER’S SEMINARY J. 87, 88 (1999) (“The clearest
New Testament text on the relationship between the Christian and civil government is
Romans 13:1-7.”).
106. Romans 13:6, 7.
107. Luke 20:25.  This statement is paraphrased in several of the books of the New
Testament. See also Mark 12:16; Matthew 22:21.
108. Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Render unto Caesar . . . ”: Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and
the Historical Underpinnings of the Modern American Tax System, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
321 (2009).
109. See McGee & Gelman, supra note 51, at 71 n. 14-15.
110. T.L. Carter, The Irony of Romans 13, NOVUM TESTAMENTUM, 46: 209 ( 2004)
(“The way to stay out of trouble and keep a clear conscience is to submit to the authori-
ties (13:5).  One should also pay taxes, since those who collect them are God’s servants
(13:6).”).
111. See Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-
Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671 (2006); Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax
Reform Based on Judeo—Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2002); Susan Pace Hamill,
A Moral Perspective on “Big Business” Fair Share of America’s Tax Burden, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 857 (2004).
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the presumptive immorality of regressive taxation from a Protestant
perspective might be further supplemented by Thesis Number 86 of
Martin Luther’s 95 Theses.112
Even with this general background on tax avoidance, the moral
question of tax avoidance has not been answered because the method
of legal interpretation from the Judeo-Christian perspective remains
as yet, unknown.  Stated most directly, the pertinent and foremost
question remains the following: What was the method of legal inter-
pretation in determining the amount of tax due by both Christian and
Jewish taxpayers in paying Roman taxes under applicable tax laws?
Both Christian and Jewish taxpayers were subject to direct and indi-
rect forms of taxation as a matter of Roman tax law and as an occu-
pied province.  This form of indirect taxation would at minimum have
required a de facto determination of the level of the taxpayer’s taxable
activity.  In other words, obviously, the tax collector and the taxpayer
were unlikely to agree on the amount of the tax to be paid under Ro-
man law even in ancient times.
1. An Alternative Translation of the Greek Word: yo´boς (tr.
“Respect”) in Romans 13:7
Much of the New Testament was first written in Greek.  Accord-
ingly, the novel translation of the Greek word yo´boς,113 taken from
Paul’s writing in the book of Romans, proposed here is that in the tax
context “respect” means obedience to the legal interpretation of the
secular tax collector (i.e., the Roman collections authority).114  This
translation might also alternately be given in the English language as
“deference.”115  Under this interpretation, the translation of “respect”
had a tangible meaning and was not merely a ceremonial implication
of bow, nod, and so forth.  Accordingly, the meaning of Paul’s writing
in Greek as part of Romans 13:7 is that the finding by the secular
Roman tax authority as to the amount of tax which was to be paid by
112. Bret N. Bogenschneider, How Helpful is Econometrics to Tax Research?, 21:3
NEW ZEALAND J. OF TAX LAW AND POL’Y 292, 301 (2015) (“Thesis 86: “Why does the pope,
whose wealth today is greater than the wealth of the richest Crassus, build the basilica
of Saint Peter with the money of poor believers rather than with his own money?”).
113. Thomas M. Coleman, Binding Obligations in Romans 13:7: A Semantic Field
and Social Context, 48 TYNDALE BULLETIN 307, 317 (1997).
114. Id. at 315.  “Paul exhorts the Roman Christians not to contribute to the civil
upheaval, but be good citizens, showing their obedience to the authorities by paying tax
to whom tax is due.” Id.
115. Id.  “Just as it was clear that the Christians had an obligation to pay tribute
and taxes, so it was their obligation to give yo´boς to whom yo´boς is due.” Id.
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the Christian authority, was to be respected as one might respect a
judicial decision.116
The modern implication is that from a Christian moral perspec-
tive a formalist interpretation of law may not suffice as to the amount
of tax to be paid.  The tax law is partly what is written, but also under
a realist approach the tax law is what the tax enforcement authority
says it is.  The deference to the tax collections authority is necessary
to make the tax system function.  For example, if Christian taxpayers
agreed to pay only the amount of tax in their own self-assessment, as
opposed to the assessment by the Roman tax authority, then the tax
system would fail.  This would of course be the outcome even if Chris-
tians agreed to pay tax, but only under their interpretation of the tax
law.  Hence, the novel interpretation proposed here is that Romans
13:7 is essentially Paul instructing early Christians to apply an inter-
pretive approach of legal realism to the tax law in the payment of Ro-
man tax.  In other words, the interpretation and application of tax
laws was as important in ancient times as in modern times, and Paul’s
intent with the Greek word yo´boς was to limit the tax avoidance activ-
ity of Christian taxpayers.
2. The Nietzschean Gambit and the Morality of Tax Avoidance
Another seminal article regarding the morality of tax avoidance
was by Leo Martinez: Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy.117  Martinez
gave, effectively, a Nietzschean response to moral claims about tax
avoidance, citing Oliver Wendell Holmes.118  He wrote:
Holmes might well have agreed that, at least in the absence
of independently wrongful conduct, tax code violations are
merely manufactured economic propositions, not moral ones
. . . .  An ordinary taxpayer’s response to the state’s decisional
and enforcement power—the desire to avoid a tax or an audit,
or the good-faith or mistaken belief (due to the complexity of
the Code) in the legality of conduct—is neither punished nor
considered morally wrong.  This may be explained by our in-
stinctual aversion to the existence of a supposed moral duty
to pay what the government decides is fair.  Punishment is
considered appropriate only when a taxpayer’s disobedience
amounts to willful tax evasion.  Such defiance is not a breach
116. Id. at 325.  “It is our contention that Paul’s letter to the Romans was written
during a time of increasing dissatisfaction over the burden of taxation in the Neronian
Prinicipate (A.D. 54-68), contrary to the general consensus among scholars that the
background of Romans 13:1-7 has its genesis primarily in the reign of Claudius (A.D.
41-54).” Id.
117. Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 521
(1994).
118. Id. at 524.
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of a moral duty, but rather an affront to the existence of the
state’s power to regulate her behavior and to demand she
obey its requirements.119
This passage is potentially very significant to the morality of tax
avoidance because if laws are merely the “will to power” (“Will to
Power”), as Nietzsche claimed, then it would be theoretically possible
to avoid any moral claims about tax avoidance whatsoever.  All levies
of taxation and tax avoidance activity could be understood as simply a
Will to Power.120  Specifically, with regard to the first claim by Marti-
nez, the shoe-horning of the Holmesian view is mistaken because it is
one permutation of an interpretation of adjudication as “legal real-
ism.”  This is an issue of legal methodology and not morality.  Simply
put, an argument that legal decisions are made based on realist con-
siderations, as opposed to formalism, is distinct from the Nietzschean
Will to Power.”
However, as to Martinez’s apparent claim that morality cannot be
applied to taxation because tax avoidance is merely the Will to Power,
the answer is, of course.121  Libertarian tax theory appears to proceed
along such Nietzschean lines because the defense of property rights is
merely an exercise of the Will to Power over other persons.122  How-
ever, the morality of tax avoidance understood as such a Will to Power
by the taxpayer does not resolve the relation of the human subject to
society.  Hence, the Hegelian and Kierkeagaardian existential ap-
proach survives the Nietzschean critique of morality, although liberta-
rian or utilitarian theory as applied to tax avoidance, succumbs to
Nietzsche by default.123
119. Id. at 524, 526.
120. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil § 13 (1967); see also Bret N.
Bogenschneider, The Will to Tax Avoidance: Nietzsche and Libertarian Jurisprudence,
2014 J. JURIS. 321, 322 (2014) (“[I]t is the accumulation of money as a human activity
that represents the exercise of power from a Nietzschean perspective, and particularly
as an aspect of Libertarian ideology.  From this fundamental distinction it follows that
the Libertarian worldview centers on the Will to Power through tax avoidance.”).
121. Martinez, supra note 117, at 542 (“However, the state’s need for tax dollars
does not necessarily coincide with a citizen’s moral obligation to obey the tax laws.  Af-
ter all, a despotic regime also collects tax dollars and few would say that a citizen living
under such a regime has a moral obligation to obey.  Moral implications certainly result
from the payment and use of tax revenue, but our obligation to obey the tax laws stems
more from the power of the government to demand obedience, particularly through the
threat of punishment, than from a moral duty to obey.”).
122. Bogenschneider, supra note 120, at 335 (“Within the tax laws, therefore, it is
not only necessary for the Libertarian not to pay taxes.  This is simply the defiance of
the power of the state.  More is required.  To fully exercise the Nietzschean Will to
Power, the Libertarian must also cause someone else to pay.”).
123. See Robert W. McGee, Duty to Whom?, in THE ETHICS OF TAX EVASION: PER-
SPECTIVES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 43 (Robert McGee ed., 2011) (“One might also apply
utilitarian ethics to conclude that there is a duty not to pay.  The argument goes some-
thing like this.  The state is not as efficient as the private sector.  We have a duty not to
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B. A POSTMODERN APPROACH TO TAX MORALITY IN THE
REPRESENTATION OF THE “BAD MAN”
An application of postmodern ethics requires a reference to
“other” people as part of an existential moral analysis.  This is, in part,
the rejection of pure “individualism” as the basis of the underlying
moral framework.  As such, neither the positing of a Lockean “natural
man” entering into society, nor a rational utilitarian decision-maker
debiting and crediting utiles of pleasure reflect postmodern moral
thought.124  The respective postmodern moral analysis thus requires a
consideration of the impact to the human subject as a taxpayer.  For
the tax lawyer engaged in the representation of the Holmesian “bad
man,” the postmodern ethical perspective might also be applied as an
aspect of moral self-reflection.
The “bad man” expects, even requires, the tax lawyer to “manu-
facture” factual indeterminacy under the tax laws.  This allows for the
avoidance of the payment of tax.  Hence, under these circumstances,
the tax lawyer might evaluate the moral considerations specifically
with regard to the “manufacture” of indeterminacy under the law.
Clearly, from the libertarian perspective, the tax lawyer should act in
the defense of property rights, which is given as the moral responsibil-
ity, apart from the impact to other people.  However, from a
postmodern perspective that is exactly the point.  The primary moral
dilemma is whether the behavior at issue recognizes “others” as
human subjects even if they are not property owners.  In the subservi-
ence to property rights, as opposed to other people, libertarian theory
might thus be viewed as expressly immoral.
The moral issue might be given as whether the lawyer properly
regards “other” taxpayers by acknowledging the functioning of the tax
system as a whole.  The “manufacture” of factual indeterminacy as tax
avoidance planning does not regard “other” taxpayers or the tax sys-
tem.  This is exactly because “other” taxpayers cannot engage in this
sort of tax planning likely at all.  In that case, the lawyer is acting
neither as a classical lawyer nor advisor, but as a tax “planner” with
the factual re-structuring of transactions.  If this is done secretly and
on behalf of a large corporation subject to a cooperative compliance
regime, even the lawyer who wishes to apply the minimum American
Bar Association standard for ethical professional conduct would need
waste resources.  We can minimize or reduce waste (increase efficiency) by not transfer-
ring resources to the less-efficient government sector . . . .  Evasion of taxes also
strengthens property rights, since taxation violates property rights.  A just society is a
society, where property rights are not violated.”).
124. Tibor R. Machan, Taxation: The Ethics of Its Avoidance or Dodging, in THE
ETHICS OF TAX EVASION: PERSPECTIVES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 75 (Robert McGee ed.,
2011).
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to have serious concern over the propriety of her conduct.  As such, to
create indeterminacy is to undermine or corrupt the application of tax
laws.  One potential indicator of the immorality of this conduct is that,
from a psychological perspective, the tax lawyer is unlikely to feel good
about what she does for a living.  From a postmodern perspective this
impact to the conscience of the tax lawyer qua planner is a potentially
significant consideration as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
If perpetually indeterminate, the tax law would simply favor the
class of taxpayers able to engage in the manufacturing of factual inde-
terminacy, thus constantly reinventing the tax law as it goes along.  A
lawyer that is actually unable to identify any determinative outcome
under the tax law cannot be a competent tax lawyer.  Hence, the pre-
sumption is that tax lawyers who plan toward indeterminacy also
have the potential to identify determinacy.  To act in the interest of
the law requires that the tax lawyer (as planner) seek out determinate
legal outcomes in favor of the client.125  To this end, the tax lawyer
ought to generally reduce the degree of factual indeterminacy in tax
planning, and not increase it.  To presumptively seek out indetermi-
nacy as a lawyer also indicates that the tax lawyer is not acting in the
role of lawyer as legal advisor instead of solely as tax planner.
The growing length and complexity of the Internal Revenue Code
and Treasury Regulations in the United States is a symptom of the
failure by the American Bar Association to enforce basic ethical re-
quirements for the practice of tax lawyers.  Accordingly, this complex-
ity does not necessarily reflect a problem with the drafting of the tax
law itself.  As such, where a tax attorney assists in the intentional
“manufacture” of artificial factual indeterminacy on behalf of the
Holmesian “bad man,” thereby increasing the uncertainty of applica-
tion of the tax law, this constitutes presumptively unethical attorney
conduct by undermining written tax laws.126
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. & scope § 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(“Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional
discretion can arise.  Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.”).
126. See generally Infanti, supra note 4, at 610 (“As was the case with the corporate
inversion technique, the tax lawyers who developed and/or assisted their clients in im-
plementing the life insurance technique breached their duty to the revenue system by
undermining the integrity of that system.  Other tax lawyers have perceived the tech-
nique as being contrary to the spirit of, and the policies underlying, the tax laws.  The
technique also undermines public confidence in the revenue system by making it appear
that those with sufficient wealth need not pay their fair share of the overall tax
burden.”).
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Furthermore, any attorney assistance with tax planning for a cli-
ent is not rendered ethical merely because it is (or might conceivably
be) legal.127  The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has said as much
with regard to penalty avoidance for the client under Circular 230.128
But, the IRS guidance on penalty avoidance does not address the ethi-
cal requirements of the attorney rendering the advice.  For example,
within the existing literature on tax “compliance,” the perception of
the overall tax system is referred to as “taxpayer morale.”129  Many
experts believe that taxpayer morale is the fundamental measure of
the success or failure of tax systems generally.130  The practice of tax
administration is concerned generally with the influence of tax policy
on taxpayer morale.131  The United States currently enjoys the high-
est taxpayer morale in the world.132  Thus, to say that “bad man” tax
planning is a “corrupting” influence on the tax law is to say that such
behavior tends to undermine taxpayer morale.  Obviously, if “bad
men” with access to tax attorneys are solely able to “manufacture” fac-
tual indeterminacy, this behavior has the potential to undermine tax
morale vis-a`-vis other taxpayers not being able to engage in this sort
of planning behavior.133  Where the tax lawyer acts to undermine tax-
payer morale, this also potentially undermines administration of the
entire tax system.
The global profession of taxation is now focused on the tax base
erosion effects of tax planning conducted by multinational firms.  This
effort is led in part by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) in what is referred to as the Base Erosion and
127. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 5, at 716 (“While it is true by definition that tax
avoidance is legal and evasion is illegal, it is a logical confusion to draw moral conclu-
sions from legal facts . . . .  It is this logical error that many judges, lawyers, and com-
mentators make when they assert that there is ‘nothing illegal or immoral’ about tax
avoidance[.]”).
128. Treasury Department Circular, No. 230 (Rev. 6-2014), available at https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pcir230.pdf; Thomas Purcell, Chair of AICPA Tax Practice Re-
sponsibilities Committee, & Edward Karl, Tax Ethics Update (Dec. 2, 2016).
129. ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR (2007); see
Ronald G. Cummings, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael McKee & Benno Torgler, Tax
morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experi-
ment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447 (2009).
130. Id.
131. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recom-
mendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 601 (2007).
132. See generally James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture differences and tax morale
in the United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCH. 224 (2006); Ronald Inglehart et
al., WORLD VALUES SURVEYS AND EUROPEAN VALUES SURVEYS, 1981-1984, 1990-1993,
AND 1995-1997 (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research (2000)).
133. Kornhauser, supra note 131, at 603 (“Non-compliance among other taxpayers
can decrease an individual’s own tax moral and compliance.”).
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Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) initiative.134  The means available to mul-
tinational firms to achieve tax “erosion” are many, but most involve
the “manufacturing” of factual indeterminacy or the intentional crea-
tion of an artificial set of facts that does not quite match the existing
tax laws.  As such, depending on the legal method, this indeterminacy
may result in non-taxation of multinational profits.  The non-taxation
of multinational firms can also be achieved more simply by the selec-
tive or non-enforcement of the tax laws with regard to favored mul-
tinational firms, as is often the case in the United States.135  And,
irrespective of the means of such tax planning, accounting firms now
act as the international “gatekeepers” toward the creation of such
“manufactured” factual indeterminacy.  To the extent tax planning of
this nature is done by accounting firms, this constitutes the practice of
law which potentially would be unethical if performed by a licensed
attorney.  Hence, the difference between the professional ethics of tax
lawyers in comparison to tax accountants may become a critical issue
in the near future.136  In either case, the “manufacture” of factual in-
determinacy constitutes a corrupting influence on the tax law because
the number of new factual scenarios is presumably infinite.
Attorney conduct in furtherance of tax avoidance by the “bad
man” is also presumptively immoral, as well as unethical, given its
tendency to undermine and corrupt the legal system.137  A moral anal-
ysis of attorney behavior should not be based on libertarian theory
premising morality exclusively on the defense of property rights,138
134. See generally OECD, Aggressive Tax Planning (last visited March 1, 2016, 6:10
PM), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/ (“Base erosion and profit shifting
(BEPS) refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps in the architecture of the
international tax system to artificially shift profits to places where there is little or no
economic activity or taxation.”).
135. Bogenschneider, supra note 32, at 931 (“Today, however, the IRS enforces the
AET only against small and medium corporations, leaving U.S. multinationals effec-
tively exempt.”).
136. See Stefan F. Tucker, The Evolving Nature of Tax Practice, 196 WM. & MARY
ANN. TAX CONF. PAPER 1, 6 (2000) (“In her testimony (on November 13, 1998), Professor
Linda Galler, of Hofstra University, addressed the differences in the standards of pro-
fessional conduct that apply to accountants and lawyers . . . .  [I]t is evident that Circu-
lar 230 needs far more teeth in it today when we are facing the proliferation of
investment firm-formulated tax shelters for multinational corporations utilizing the in-
terplay of Internal Revenue Code Sections intended to apply, independently, to quite
different facts and circumstances.”).
137. Infanti, supra note 4, at 603 (“A variety of provisions in the Model Rules evince
the legal profession’s commitment to serving the public good.  Indeed, the first para-
graph of the preamble to the Model Rules makes clear that a lawyer is not only a repre-
sentative of clients, but also ‘an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having
special responsibility for the quality of justice.’  The preamble goes on to specify that, in
her role as a public citizen, ‘a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the
legal system, the administration of justice, and the quality of service rendered by the
legal profession.’”).
138. See generally Daniel Attas, Fragmenting Property, 25 LAW & PHIL. 119 (2006).
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nor tortured re-interpretations of the Kantian “Categorical Impera-
tive” seeking to balance utiles gained versus lost.139  Rather,
postmodern ethical theory, taken as approaches flavored by Kierke-
gaard, Hegel, Foucault, Sartre or other works by the great theorists,
indicates that the manufacture of factual indeterminacy by the tax
lawyer as part of legal representation is potentially immoral not solely
because of the anticipated negative consequences to society of tax
avoidance behavior viewed in Rawlsian terms.  The immorality of this
conduct potentially remains even where the conduct may be held to be
lawful and consistent with professional ethical standards.  Finally, the
widely-held view of Christian ethics, particularly as given in Romans
13:6, that tax evasion is not presumptively immoral as long as it com-
plies with the law, does not apply to undisclosed “manufactured” fac-
tual indeterminacy planning, at least where the Greek word yo´boς is
translated as deference to the taxing authority in the interpretation of
tax laws.
139. McGee, supra note 123.
